legal rules expressed in language. More particularly, the phenomenon of open texture, as identified by Waismann, must be a feature of all legal rules. 1 To illustrate, imagine a legal rule pertaining to goldfinches -say, a rule declaring the goldfinch to be an endangered species and thus protected against hunting, capturing, and the like. The rule would specify what could or could not be done with or to goldfinches, and, because "goldfinch" is a term with no special legal meaning, might then implicitly or explicitly incorporate the ordinary meaning of "goldfinch" then present in the language. But if someone were charged with violating the law by, say, capturing an exploding goldfinch, the very uncertainty of whether such a creature was a goldfinch at all would make the legal consequences of the capture pro tanto uncertain as well.
If Waismann's idea is sound, then open texture is indeed an ineliminable feature of law,
but it is ineliminable in law precisely because it is ineliminable in language. As long as law is written and understood in language, then the characteristics of language infuse law as well.
Law is thus open-textured, and necessarily so, just because of the ineliminable open texture of language, but this conclusion does not yet suggest that legal open texture is any more than, or any less than, the open texture of the terms in which the law is written and understood.
Is the Open Texture of Law More than the Open Texture of its Language?
The open texture of language thus produces open texture in law, but this conclusion is neither startling nor particularly interesting. That there is something about law, or more precisely about legal rules, that seems to Hart analogous to the open texture of language, but which is not simply the open texture of language, is suggested by the no-vehicles-in-the-park example. The no-vehicles-in-the-park rule is a straightforward example of a rule. Many rules, including this one, are presently both underand over-inclusive with respect to their background justifications (Alexander & Sherwin, 2001; . Consider the typical highway speed limit. The speed limit is a rule, designed to serve the background justification of fostering highway safety. But we know now that a designated speed limit aimed at ensuring safe driving will excessively limit some experienced and safe drivers under ideal conditions who are in fact driving safely, albeit above the speed limit. And by reaching some instances of safe driving, the rule reaches beyond its background justification, and is accordingly over-inclusive. Conversely, some forms of unsafe drivingdriving just below the limit in snow and ice, for example, or an inexperienced driver's driving right at a high motorway limit -are not covered by the speed limit rule. The rule is thus underinclusive to the extent that some behaviors covered by the rule's background justification of ensuring safety are not covered by the rule itself. But neither such over-nor under-inclusion represents open-texture in either Waismann's or Hart's senses, because neither involves a confrontation with what was previously unexpected or undecided. For all of the reasons of predictability and consistency, among others, that we use rules, the speed limit rule is knowingly adopted with full-knowledge of its under-and over-inclusion, and with, ideally, full appreciation of the fact that achieving the virtues of rule-based decision-making involves enduring the vices of a rule's under-and over-inclusiveness.
In other instances, however, the tokens of under-or over-inclusiveness may not be imagined by the rule-makers at the time a rule is made, and thus not anticipated in selecting the language of the rule. Such instances are presumably what Hart had in mind when he used the example of the toy electric motor-car (Bix 1993, 17-35) . He considered it an example of legal open-texture because a particular application of a rule was not settled by the language of the rule, as it would have been had the rule-maker specified that the prohibited vehicles were of a certain size, or propelled in a particular way, or capable of carrying a designated number of passengers. But in Hart's example, the extension of the rule is not so limited, extending to anything that is a "vehicle." And because we do not know whether the toy electric motor-car is a vehicle, we do not know whether it contravenes the no-vehicles-in-the-park rule. 
On the Possibility of Closure Rules
As noted above, rules may contain closure provisions, excluding (or, in theory, including) all applications not plainly encompassed by the rule. And as Hart observed (Hart 1994, 272) , Jeremy Bentham imagined and discussed just this kind of rule, one with its own specified closure. For Bentham, who notoriously abhorred the idea of judicial legislation, a gap in the law was not the occasion for judicial gap-filling, but for legislative action, albeit legislative action prompted by the a proposal from the judge. Bentham, with his penchant for neologisms, called this the "suspensive" power or "sistitive" function, whereby a judge would suspend execution of the law pending legislative revision (Postema 1986, 434-439) . For present purposes, however, the issue is not principally about the strategy to be followed when a legal rule does not plainly cover some occurrence in the world. Rather, Bentham shows that a set of rules can in theory provide a closure or default rule specifying what is to happen in all events not plainly covered by the existing rules (Gardner 2001, 212) . Consider the implicit closure rule of the Anglo-American criminal law, according to which all behavior not clearly prohibited by an enacted legal prohibition is permitted. Or consider a hypothetical rule of private law, pursuant to which claimants could recover against defendants only if an explicit rule authorized such recovery, and only if the claimant's actual claim clearly fell within such an explicit rule. In all other cases, the claim would fail. This might well be a bad rule, neglecting to account for the fact that in private law an uncompensated wrongfully caused injury is as regrettable as compensation where there is no injury or wrong. But the justice or injustice of the rule is a side issue. What is important is simply that a closure or default rule is entirely possible.
Any closure rule would, of course, remain subject to the open texture of the language of the closure rule itself. But if the closure rule's language were determinate, then there is no reason why law would necessarily be compelled to face a situation in which the law simply runs out, in the way that language runs out when confronted with the exploding goldfinch. Indeed, Hart appears to concede as much, in his posthumously published "Postscript," when he is describing Bentham's approach (Hart 1994, 272 
The Possibility of Non-Defeasibility
With the foregoing analysis in mind, consider Hart's claim that a rule with an "unless"
clause can still be a rule (Hart 1994, 136) . This itself seems uncontroversial. A rule that is specified in "If A, then φ, unless B" form is merely a different way of formulating a rule with multiple conditions for its application, as in "If A and not-B, then φ" , Stone 1985 . 2 Moreover, using an "unless" clause is sometimes a method of formulating a genuine reason-providing but still non-absolute rule. In American constitutional law, for example, a governmental classification by race is unconstitutional unless the government can justify such a classification by a "compelling interest" where it is understood that a compelling interest is a heightened standard of justification substantially stronger than that minimally necessary -a 2 I put aside burden-of-proof considerations, which may make the two formulations more different than they would be absent such considerations (Chapman 1998; Finkelstein, 1999) .
mere "rational basis" -typically needed to justify ordinary legislative classifications (Loving v. Virginia 1967) . But neither using an "unless" clause to formulate a rule with multiple conditions for its application nor using one to express a non-absolute rule genuinely implicate the idea of open texture. The latter is, to be sure, a way of accommodating for the possibility that the details of all potential overrides cannot fully be anticipated in advance, but still differs from the case in which specific law confronts the genuinely unexpected. Making rules defeasible and using a vague standard for defeat is a way of managing the uncertainty of the future, but is different from the case in which a non-vague rule confronts the genuinely unexpected.
Although intentional vagueness to manage an uncertain future is more or less straightforward, Hart makes a stronger and more problematic claim when he maintains not only that a rule with an "unless" clause is still a rule, but also that the list of "unlesses" cannot be exhaustively specified in advance. (Hart 1994, 136; MacCormick, 1974, 117) . In this he marks a position now quite common in the legal literature. Richard Posner, for example, insists that courts always (the word is crucial) retain the power to append "ad hoc exceptions" at the moment of application even to existing, precise, and exceptionless rules (Posner 1988, 834-835) . Similarly, Richard Tur argues that courts necessarily have the power to set aside the indications of rules in the service of equity or justice when applying the rule would produce an unjust result or a one at odds with the rule's background justification (Tur 2001 ), Ronald
Dworkin has described the list of legal principles as "numberless," (Dworkin 1977: 43-44) , and
Neil MacCormick has offered a slightly more qualified version (MacCormick 1995) of the same claim. And although Ronald Dworkin's later insistence that there is a "real" rule existing behind the formal words of a written rule is mysterious (Bix 1993, 34-35) , the heart of his argument is the view, related to those just set out, that written rules are necessarily defeasible in the service of the real rule lurking in the background (Dworkin 1986 Riggs illustrates the distinction between a rule that gives no answer and a rule that gives a bad answer, and precisely this distinction undercuts the claim of necessary defeasibility. The rule in Riggs did not contain an "unless" clause, and thus we might conclude, or Hart might have concluded, that Riggs presents a situation not envisaged when the rule was drafted. And we might also conclude that the situation presented by Riggs is one in which a previously unimagined situation shows how a hitherto unneeded and unanticipated "unless" clause might have been a good idea. Yet even if that is so, the rule without the "unless" clause is still capable of generating a clear outcome, albeit a morally (in this case) unpalatable one. Consequently, the existence of hypothetical "unless" clauses whose addition would have prevented an unfortunate outcome is insufficient to make the case that legal rules are necessarily defeasible.
If there is such a case to be made, essentially a claim that all of the rules in a system should have open-ended "unless" clauses, it must be a moral or policy claim rather than a logical or linguistic one. A rule that ill serves its background justification in a particular case is still a rule capable of producing an outcome, and whether such an outcome should be tolerated when it is unsound as a moral or policy matter is different from whether such an outcome presents an "exploding goldfinch" type of genuine uncertainty.
On the Grounds for Defeasibility
When the New York court concluded in Riggs that Elmer could not inherit because of the "no man shall profit from his own wrong" principle, it treated the most directly applicable legal rule as defeasible in the service of justice. The "no man may profit from his own wrong" principle is narrower than the full domain of justice, but few dimensions of justice -probably no dimensions of justice --are not instantiated by some common law principle. Thus, the court avoided the unjust outcome by implicitly concluding that all legal rules are defeasible in the service of justice. And a similar situation arises when the rule-generated outcome result is If we depart the realm of the real and enter that of the hypothetical, we see the same phenomenon captured in Lon Fuller's famous response to Hart's no-vehicles-in-the-park example (Fuller 1958 , responding to Hart 1958 . Fuller imagined a group of patriots who installed a fully functional military truck in the park as a war memorial. This would clearly be a vehicle, Fuller argued, but it would just as clearly be absurd to exclude it from the park on the authority of the "no vehicles in the park" rule.
Had this been an empirical debate, Fuller may well have won. If Hart is understood to
claim that the plain meaning of the terms of a rule provides a conclusive answer in most real cases in real legal systems, and if Fuller is understood as responding that the plain meaning answer was typically defeasible and rarely conclusive in well-functioning legal systems, then
Fuller is closer than Hart to the reality in many modern legal systems (Schauer 2008) .
But Fuller made a broader claim. For him (and Dworkin, MacCormick, Posner, and Tur), it is not merely a contingent empirical fact that legal rules are typically (and, to Fuller, preferably) defeasible in common law legal systems, but also that the defeasibility of legal rules is an essential feature of legality itself, on a par with those other desiderata of legality that for
Fuller came close to defining law itself (Fuller 1969) . For Fuller, failing to treat a rule like the no-vehicles-in-the-park rule as defeasible was simply to abandon reason, and for him it was of the essence of law that it be reasonable. A system that did not allow purpose-based or equitable override of the plain indication of a legal rule when necessary to achieve a reasonable outcome was for that reason just so much less of a legal system, and perhaps not even a legal system at all. Indeed, we can understand Fuller's claim in the best light, and without saddling him with the view that nondefeasible law is not law at all, by interpreting him as maintaining that non-defeasible law is necessarily defective as law, even if the defective law is still law. Just as any boat that leaks is defective as a boat even as it remains a boat, so Fuller is best understood as insisting that any legal system is necessarily defective as a legal system, and as law, insofar as it treats its rules as non-defeasible.
The course of action that Fuller rejects, however, is conceptually possible, often adopted, and often far from unjustifiable. The New York Court of Appeals could have said that
Palmer would inherit despite the wrong he committed, just as the United States Supreme Court could have concluded that Kirby violated federal law even though he did it for good reason, and even though punishing Kirby was inconsistent with the purpose of the law he literally violated.
And some hypothetical judge could conclude that a war memorial made from a functioning military truck was nevertheless a vehicle, and thus to be excluded from the park by virtue of the no-vehicles-in-the-park rule. Such outcomes might be condemned as ridiculous or absurd, or, even more pejoratively in some legal circles, formalistic, but they are neither conceptually nor linguistically impossible. As long as words have literal meanings with a context-independent core, and as long the meaning of a word is not entirely a function of the particular context in which it is used on a particular occasion (Bix, 1993, 21-22) , then rules -which are written in words -can indeed generate poor outcomes, and judges can embody those poor outcomes in their rulings.
Indeed, not only can this happen, but it does -frequently. The result in Riggs is more exceptional than normal, even in the anti-formal American judicial system. There are other cases in which the outcomes do resemble those in Riggs, but in many others beneficiaries who were culpably responsible for the death of the testator were allowed to inherit. (Schauer 2004 ). There are numerous other examples, in the United States and elsewhere, and it would be mistaken to describe the defeasibility of legal rules as a universal or even overwhelmingly common feature of legal decision-making. Although legal decision-makers sometimes treat rules as defeasible, frequently they do not. Often they treat the literal language of a rule formulation as conclusive, and refrain from adding exceptions at the moment of application, overriding the indications of rules in the service of justice or equity or efficiency, or modifying rules at the moment of application. Such non-defeasibility may not be wise, but it is both stability for stability's sake, treating the rules as defeasible comes at the sacrifice of each of these values, even though of course it brings the potential advantages of fairness, equity, and, in theory, reaching the correct result in every instance.
The Contingency of Defeasibility
It now becomes apparent that the traditional defenses of the necessary defeasibility of legal rules -whether Hart's, or Posner's, or MacCormick's, or Tur's -mostly rest on a certain view about the powers and abilities of judges. Few people would maintain that police officers or ordinary bureaucrats, for example, should have the power to revise the rules that constrain them when those rules appear to indicate a poor outcome in a particular case. And if that is so, then the view that defeasibility in the hands of judges is required by the Rule of Law while defeasibility in hands of others is not turns out to be a view about the capacities of judges within particular legal systems. So long as we can imagine something properly called a legal system in which the power of rule revision and rule override is not entrusted to judges, then we can imagine something properly called a legal system in which defeasibility is somewhat or even largely absent.
Defeasibility is thus not a property of rules at all, but rather a characteristic of how some decision-making system will choose to treat its rules. The Wittgensteinian maxim that rules do not determine their own applications reminds us that how a rule will be treated is not something inherent in the rule itself. If the plain or literal (but not necessarily the ordinary language) meaning of a rule can indicate an outcome, it is a function not of the rule but of how the rule will be treated whether that indicated outcome is to be taken as conclusive, 
